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Chapter II - Prohibition of Certain Agreements, Abuse of Dominant Position and Regulation of Combinations

Section 3

Section 3: anti-competitive agreements

Section 3 restricts agreements that cause or are likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India. It identifies horizontal cartel conduct and vertical restraints, while preserving specified exceptions.

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Need advice on Section 3?

This article is for general information. Refer to the Competition Act, 2002 official text for the official provisions. If you need professional advice for your situation, contact Bizeneed.

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Statutory text

Bare law

(1) No enterprise or association of enterprises or person or association of persons shall enter into any agreement in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services, which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India. (2) Any agreement entered into in contravention of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) shall be void.

(3) Any agreement entered into between enterprises or associations of enterprises or persons or associations of persons or between any person and enterprise or practice carried on, or decision taken by, any association of enterprises or association of persons, including cartels, engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services, which— (a) directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices; (b) limits or controls production, supply, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services; (c) shares the market or source of production or provision of services by way of allocation of geographical area of market, or type of goods or services, or number of customers in the market or any other similar way; (d) directly or indirectly results in bid rigging or collusive bidding, shall be presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any agreement entered into by way of joint ventures if such agreement increases efficiency in production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services. Provided further that an enterprise or association of enterprises or a person or association of persons though not engaged in identical or similar trade shall also be presumed to be part of the agreement under this sub-section if it participates or intends to participate in the furtherance of such agreement. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, ‘bid rigging’ means any agreement, between enterprises or persons referred to in sub-section (3) engaged in identical or similar production or trading of goods or provision of services, which has the effect of eliminating or reducing competition for bids or adversely affecting or manipulating the process for bidding.

(4) Any other agreement amongst enterprises or persons including but not restricted to agreement amongst enterprises or persons at different stages or levels of the production chain in different markets, in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, sale or price of, or trade in goods or provision of services, including— (a) tie-in arrangement; (b) exclusive dealing agreement; (c) exclusive distribution agreement; (d) refusal to deal; (e) resale price maintenance, shall be an agreement in contravention of sub-section (1) if such agreement causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India. Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to an agreement entered into between an enterprise and an end consumer. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,— (a) ‘tie-in arrangement’ includes any agreement requiring a purchaser of goods or services, as a condition of such purchase, to purchase some other distinct goods or services; (b) ‘exclusive dealing agreement’ includes any agreement restricting in any manner the purchaser or the seller, as the case may be, in the course of his trade from acquiring or selling or otherwise dealing in any goods or services other than those of the seller or the purchaser or any other person, as the case may be; (c) ‘exclusive distribution agreement’ includes any agreement to limit, restrict or withhold the output or supply of any goods or services or allocate any area or market for the disposal or sale of the goods or services; (d) ‘refusal to deal’ includes any agreement which restricts, or is likely to restrict, by any method the persons or classes of persons to whom goods or services are sold or from whom goods or services are bought; (e) ‘resale price maintenance’ includes, in case of any agreement to sell goods or provide services, any direct or indirect restriction that the prices to be charged on the resale by the purchaser shall be the prices stipulated by the seller unless it is clearly stated that prices lower than those prices may be charged.

(5) Nothing contained in this section shall restrict— (i) the right of any person to restrain any infringement of, or to impose reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting any of his rights which have been or may be conferred upon him under— (a) the Copyright Act, 1957 (14 of 1957); (b) the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970); (c) the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958) or the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (47 of 1999); (d) the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 (48 of 1999); (e) the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000); (f) the Semi-conductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design Act, 2000 (37 of 2000); (g) any other law for the time being in force relating to the protection of other intellectual property rights. (ii) the right of any person to export goods from India to the extent to which the agreement relates exclusively to the production, supply, distribution or control of goods or provision of services for such export.

Introduction

The general rule in subsection (1) turns on competitive effect in India. Subsection (3) presumes that certain coordination among competitors has that effect; subsection (4) covers other commercial arrangements when the effect is established.

Key takeaways

1

Core prohibition

An agreement concerning goods or services that causes or is likely to cause appreciable adverse effect on competition within India is prohibited and void.

2

Competitor coordination

Price fixing, output limitation, market sharing and bid rigging are listed in subsection (3) and carry a statutory presumption; the 2023 wording also covers a facilitator not in the same trade when the stated participation test is met.

3

Other commercial restraints

Tie-ins, exclusive dealing or distribution, refusal to deal and resale price maintenance are assessed under subsection (4)'s effect test, with an express end-consumer exclusion.

4

Limited carve-outs

The section preserves efficiency-enhancing joint ventures under subsection (3), reasonable conditions needed to protect listed intellectual-property rights and exclusively export-related arrangements within subsection (5).

Identify the parties and agreement

Record whether the parties are competitors, are at different levels of a supply chain, or participate in another arrangement. The subsection (3) presumption and subsection (4) effect test operate differently.

Check pricing, output and tender coordination

Compare communications and decisions against the subsection (3) categories: prices, production or supply limits, customer or territory allocation, and bid rigging. A participant need not be in identical or similar trade if it participates or intends to participate in furthering the agreement under the inserted proviso.

Assess distribution terms and competitive effect

Review tie-ins, exclusive dealing, exclusive distribution, refusal to deal and resale price maintenance against the agreement's actual or likely effect on competition in India. The subsection (4) carve-out concerns agreements between an enterprise and an end consumer.

Test any stated exception

A joint-venture arrangement must satisfy the statutory efficiency condition. Intellectual-property restrictions must be reasonable conditions necessary to protect specified rights; the export exception is limited to agreements relating exclusively to specified export activity.

Practical checklist

Do

  • Keep contemporaneous records of the purpose and actual terms of any competitor or distribution arrangement.
  • Review tender communications and pricing decisions for the specific subsection (3) categories.
  • Document efficiency or intellectual-property grounds if relying on a statutory exception.

Avoid

  • Do not assume every vertical contract is automatically unlawful; subsection (4) has an effect test.
  • Do not assume a facilitator outside the competitors' trade is outside subsection (3) after the 2023 proviso.
  • Do not treat an intellectual-property right as a blanket exemption from competition scrutiny.

Glossary

Appreciable adverse effect on competition
The competitive harm within India referred to by subsection (1) and used in the tests under subsections (3) and (4).
Bid rigging
An agreement among the specified participants that eliminates or reduces competition for bids or adversely affects or manipulates the bidding process.
Resale price maintenance
The section's specified direct or indirect restriction on a purchaser's resale pricing, subject to its lower-price wording.

Frequently asked questions

Are all exclusive distribution agreements prohibited?

No. Subsection (4) requires the agreement to cause or be likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India.

Does the horizontal-agreement presumption apply only to competitors?

The listed subsection (3) conduct relates to identical or similar trade, but the 2023 proviso also presumes participation by a person outside that trade if they participate or intend to participate in furthering the agreement.

Need help applying this provision to your situation?

Contact Bizeneed

Last updated 9 October 2026